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Abstract: As health information privacy concern of the public raises, people are hesitant on disclosure of their private health 
information for personalized health services from using mobile health. The tension between personalization and privacy 
hinders users’ adoption of mobile health services. In this study, we draw on game theory to explain the 
personalization-privacy paradox in the usage of mobile health services. The results show that: (1) In a one-shot game, the 
strategy set of mobile health marketers and users will be contrary to their original motivations. (2) In a repeated game, 
collecting users’ private health information in a friendly way and disclosing private health information will be dominant 
strategies for both players. Managers need to pay attention to these scenarios in promoting usage of mobile health services. 
 
Keywords: game theory, mHealth, personalization, privacy concern, technology acceptance  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As the mobile information communication technology evolves, the usage of mobile devices for accessing 
personalized healthcare services has dramatically increased 
[1]
. Mobile health (mHealth)  can capture users’ 
health information and preferences in digital format and suggest corresponding individual-tailored health 
services to users. Using mHealth services will bring benefits to users including personalized health information, 
lower healthcare costs, improved medical outcomes, a more effective health services process, and a more 
efficient personal health data management 
[2]
. Due to the capable features of mobile information communication 
technology, such as Global Position System (GPS) and sensors, the mHealth service providers or marketers can 
easily collect individuals’ real-time health data including walking steps, heart rate, and blood pressure through 
their mobile device.  To seek personalized health services and consult health professionals through mobile 
platforms, users are required to upload or report their health records, medical histories, demographic 
characteristics, and contact numbers, and so forth onto the platform. Based on real-time and self-reported health 
information, the service providers command a better position to understand users’ health needs and hence 
provide customized health services. Despite the popularity of personalized health services, they are reluctant to 
report and disclose their private health-related information and data to mHealth marketers in view of the 
growing privacy concern in recent years.  Such dilemma  can be considered as a  personalization-privacy 
paradox 
[3]
,  suggesting “the tension between how the developers and marketers of IT applications exploit 
users’ information to offer them personalized services, and those users’ growing concerns about the privacy of 
that information, which can restrain their use of such applications” [4]. In the management information systems 
(MIS) literature, individuals’ intentions to adopt a new technology is promoted by personalization but 
discouraged by privacy concern. Recent empirical studies highlight such personalization-privacy paradox in the 
use of online personalized services 
[5]
, electronic health records (EHRs) 
[6]
, smartphone 
[4]
, and mHealth services 
[7]
. 
One novel aspect of this study is to use the game theory to explain the role of personalization-privacy 
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paradox in the adoption of mHealth services. From the game-theoretical perspective, mobile health users and 
mobile health marketers can be regarded two game players. The strategy set of mobile health marketers includes 
a friendly way and a hostile way to collect private health information, respectively.  The former requires 
mobile health marketers to collect and analyze users’ private health information in a friendly way, offering them 
personalized health information and services based on users’ private health information.  The latter performs 
such activities in a hostile way with the intention to abuse or disclose users’ private health information for illegal 
profit-making. The strategy set of mobile health users includes 1) disclosing or 2) protecting personal private 
health information.  In the first one, mobile health users allow mobile health marketers to collect their private 
health information and enjoy personalized health information and services in return for health care.  
Alternatively, they refuse to share their private health information with mobile health marketers, keeping their 
private health information safe under the second strategy.  
Payoff functions of this game present the profits and losses of two players. The losses and payoffs of two 
players’ strategic actions are significant determinants of their decision-making.  Based on the game-theoretic 
perspective, this study aims to investigate how to reduce users’ health privacy concern and leverage the power 
of personalization in promoting the usage of mobile health services. 
In a two player game, mobile health users will make a response according to the strategies of mobile health 
marketers. To maximize payoffs, mobile health marketers’ dominant strategy is to collect users’ private health 
information in a hostile way when users choose to disclose their private health information. Therefore, based on 
the marketers’ strategy, users are reluctant to share their private health information because the latter worried 
about unintentional disclosure of their private health information or even abuse for illegal profit-making.  
While this strategy set could partially explain the personalization-privacy paradox, yet this result may be only 
applied in the context of a one-shot game. Indeed, many mobile health marketers prefer a long-term relationship 
with their users for maximum profit rather than a one-shot game. Although mobile health users have a concern 
about their health privacy, they are keen on personalized health services. Strategies of two players in a long-term 
relationship may differ from those of a one-shot game. To better explain the personalization-privacy paradox in 
mHealth context, we discuss both players’ strategies and payoffs from perspectives of both a one-shot game and 
a repeated game.   
In this study, we follow two rules: 1) different users have different tolerance levels in private health 
information disclosure; 2) the possibility of users’ private health information disclosure will increase if mobile 
health marketers frequently come to collect users’ private health information. Therefore, we assume that the way 
marketers collecting users’ private health information under users’ tolerance level is seen as a friendly way, 
however, the way of collecting users’ private health information beyond users’ tolerance level is seen as a hostile 
way. Obviously, different strategies of two players will bring different payoffs and losses to each other. Both 
players will take into consideration their prior beliefs in evaluating payoffs and losses in the game. Therefore, a 
repeated game theory may be appropriate to explain this process, and Nash equilibrium may exist in this game.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss strategies and payoffs of 
mobile health marketers and users in a one-shot game. Next, we describe strategies and payoffs of two players 
respectively in a repeated game. We conclude with a description of our results and implications for research and 
practice.  
 
2. STRATEGIES AND PAYOFFS OF TWO PLAYERS IN A ONE-SHOT GAME  
In this game, two game players include private health information marketers and mobile health users. We 
discuss their different strategies and payoffs when using different strategies in this game respectively. 
U_profit
dis 
fri  refers to the profit that mobile health users gained when mobile health marketers take the 
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strategy of collecting users’ private health information in a friendly way, and mobile health users take the 
strategy of disclosing their private health information. This also refers to the profit mobile health users lost when 
mobile health marketers take the strategy of collecting users’ private health information in a friendly way, 
however, mobile health users are reluctant to disclose their private health information. This profit indicates that 
mobile health users could gain personalized health information and services to better serve their health needs.  
M_profit
dis 
fri  refers to the profit mobile health marketers gained when mobile health marketers choose to 
collect users’ private health information in a friendly way, while users allow marketers to collect their private 
health information from them. This profit means that mobile health marketers could better understand users’ 
specific health need and design mobile health services through collecting and analyzing users’ private health 
information. 
U_loss
dis 
hos refers to the loss mobile health users suffered when mobile health marketers choose to collect 
users’ private health information in a hostile way, while users allow marketers to collect their health information. 
The loss is that mobile health users’ private health information is abused and leaked out for illegal profit-making 
by mobile health marketers. 
M_income
dis 
hos refers to the profit mobile health marketers gained when mobile health marketers take the 
strategy of collecting users’ private health information in a hostile way, while mobile health users choose to 
disclose their private health information. This profit is different from the profit gained through collecting private 
health information in a friendly way. Although mobile health marketers may undertake higher risk, they can gain 
a higher profit from this strategy of collecting users’ private health information in a hostile way. 
U_income
pro 
hos  refers to the profit mobile health users gained when mobile health marketers collect users’ 
private health information in a hostile way, while mobile health users refuse to share their private health 
information with marketers. These profits indicate that mobile health users protect their health privacy and avoid 
the risk that they may suffer from private health information disclosure and abuse. 
Based on the above analysis, both game players should choose following strategies: collecting private 
health information in a friendly way and disclosing private health information respectively, in order to gain 
profits and nurture a trusting relationship. When two players choose strategy set: collecting private health 
information a hostile way and disclosing private health information respectively, mobile health marketers could 
gain higher payoffs while mobile health users suffer losses in this game. When both game players choose 
strategy set: collecting private health information in a friendly way and protecting private health information 
respectively, mobile health marketers could not gain any profit and mobile health users miss the opportunity to 
enjoy personalized health information and services. When both game players choose strategy set: collecting 
health information in a hostile way and protecting private health information respectively, mobile health 
marketers could not gain any profit in this process, however, mobile health users prevent their private health 
information from private health information abuse. This game matrix is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Game Matrix in a One-shot Game 
Mobile Health Users 
Mobile Health Marketers 
Friendly Hostile 
Disclose U_profit
dis 
fri , M_profit
dis 
fri  -U_loss
dis 
hos, M_profit
dis 
hos 
Protect -U_profit
dis 
fri , 0 U_profit
pro 
hos , 0 
From the perspective of mobile health marketers, when mobile health users choose the strategy of 
disclosing private health information, the dominant strategy of mobile health marketers is to collect private 
health information in a hostile way. That is M_profit
dis 
hos＞M_profit
dis 
fri . When mobile health users choose the 
strategy of protecting their private health information, the profit for mobile health marketers will be 0. From the 
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perspective of mobile health users, when mobile health marketers choose the strategy of collecting private 
health information in a friendly way, the dominant strategy of mobile health users is disclosing private health 
information. That is U_profit
dis 
fri ＞-U_profit
dis 
fri . When mobile health marketers choose the strategy of collecting 
private health information in a hostile way, the dominant strategy of mobile health users is protecting their 
private health information. That is U_profit
pro 
hos＞-U_loss
dis 
hos. Based on the above strategies, there is a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium (U_profit
pro 
hos , 0) in this game matrix. However, in fact, both mobile health marketers and users 
aim to communicate and share information through this emerging platform in a long term. Therefore, both 
marketers and users may not actually have the outcome reaching this Nash equilibrium. Although users may 
face the risk of privacy disclosure or abuse, they still choose to share their private health information in order to 
get better-personalized health information and services. To get continued profit, mobile marketers may change 
their strategies for longer-term customer relationship development. The dominant strategy of this game may be 
contrary to both players’ original motivations. Therefore, this echoes a prisoner’s dilemma between mobile 
health marketers and users which is discussed in a repeated game context below. 
 
3. STRATEGIES AND PAYOFFS OF TWO PLAYERS IN A REPEATED GAME 
Further to a one-shot game, we draw on a repeated game to discuss the prisoners’ dilemma between mobile 
health marketers and mobile health users. Strategy sets of both players are a finite set. Then, in this repeated 
game process, the payoff of each strategy of mobile health marketers and mobile health users will be discussed 
as follows. δ refers to a discount factor of mobile health users’ future payoff and ζ refers to a discount factor of 
mobile health marketers’ future payoff.  
From the perspective of mobile health users, when mobile health marketers collect private health 
information from users in a friendly way, users can choose to disclose their private health information or not. In 
this context, the payoff of users will be presented as u_profit
dis 
fri . Therefore, when mobile health marketers collect 
users’ private health information at the nth time, mobile health users’ payoff is Ur_profitdis fri .  
U
r
_profit
dis 
fri = u_profit
dis 
fri + u_profit
dis 
fri *δ+ u_profit
dis 
fri *δ
2+ …+ u_profit
dis 
fri *δ
n 
= u_profit
dis 
fri *


-1
-1 n  
When mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information in a hostile way, mobile health 
users choose to disclose their private health information. In this context, the payoff of users will be presented as 
u_loss
dis 
hos . Therefore, when mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information at the n
th 
time, 
mobile health users’ payoff is Ur_loss
dis 
hos. 
U
r
_loss
dis 
hos=u_loss
dis 
hos+u_loss
dis 
hos*δ+ u_loss
dis 
hos*δ
2 +…+ u_loss
dis 
hos*δ
n 
= u_loss
dis 
hos*δ*


-1
-1 n  
When mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information in a hostile way, mobile health 
users choose to protect their private health information. In this context, the payoff of users will be presented as 
u_profit
pro 
hos . Therefore, when mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information at the n
th 
time, 
mobile health users’ payoff is Ur_profit
pro 
hos .  
U
r
_profit
pro 
hos=u_profit
pro 
hos+u_profit
pro 
hos *+u_profit
pro 
hos *δ
2 +…+ u_profit
pro 
hos *δ
n
= u_profit
pro 
hos *


-1
-1 n  
From the perspective of mobile health marketers, when marketers choose to collected users’ private health 
information in a friendly way, mobile health users disclose their private health information. In this context, the 
payoff of marketers will be presented as m_profit
dis 
fri . Therefore, when mobile health marketers collect users’ 
private health information at the n
th time, mobile health marketers’ payoff is Mr _profit
dis 
fri .    
M
r
_ profit
dis 
fri =m_ profit
dis 
fri +m_profit
dis 
fri *ζ + m_ profit
dis 
fri *ζ
2 +…+ m_ profit
dis 
fri *ζ
n 
= m_ profit
dis 
fri *


-1
-1 n  
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When mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information in a hostile way, mobile health 
users choose to disclose their private health information. In this context, the payoff of marketers will be 
presented as m_profit
dis 
hos. Therefore, when mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information at the 
n
th time, mobile health marketers’ payoff is Mr_profit
dis 
hos. 
M
r
_profit
dis 
hos =m_ profit
dis 
hos +m_ profit
dis 
hos*ζ +m_ profit
dis 
hos*ζ
2+…+ m_ profit
dis 
hos *ζ
n 
= m_ profit
dis 
hos *


-1
-1 n  
When mobile heath marketers collect users’ private health information in a hostile way, mobile health users 
choose to protect their private health information. In this context, the payoff of marketers will be presented as 
m_loss
pro 
hos . Therefore, when mobile health marketers collect users’ private health information at the n
th 
time, 
mobile health marketers’ payoff is Mr_ loss
pro 
hos . 
M
r
_ loss
pro 
hos =m_ loss
pro 
hos  + m_loss
pro 
hos *ζ + m_loss
pro 
hos *ζ
2+…+ m_loss
pro 
hos *ζ
n
 =
 
m_loss
pro 
hos *


-1
-1 n  
Based on the above payoffs and losses of mobile health users and mobile health marketers, the game matrix 
of two players in this context is listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Game Matrix in a Repeated Game 
 
Mobile Health Users 
Mobile Health Marketers 
Friendly Hostile 
Disclose Ur_profit
dis 
fri , M
r_ profit
dis 
fri  - U
r_loss
dis 
hos, M
r profit
dis 
hos 
Protect - Ur_profit
dis 
fri , 0 U
r_profit
pro 
hos , -M
r_loss
pro 
hos  
 
Under this repeated game, when mobile health users’ strategy is to disclose their private health information, 
the dominant strategy for mobile health marketers is to collect users’ private health information in a hostile way 
rather than collecting data in a friendly way. Therefore, we can have that M
r
_profit
dis 
hos＞M
r
_profit
dis 
fri . When mobile 
health users’ strategy is to protect their private health information, the dominant strategy for mobile health 
marketers is to collect users’ private health information in a friendly way. Accordingly, we can have -Mr_loss
pro 
hos
＜0. From the perspective of mobile health users, when marketers’ strategy is to collect private health 
information in a friendly way, disclosing private health information is profitable for users. Therefore, we can 
have that U
r
_profit
dis 
fri ＞- U
r
_profit
dis 
fri . When marketers’ strategy is to collect private health information in a 
hostile way, protecting private health information is profitable for users. Accordingly, we can have that U
r
_profit
pro 
hos＞- U
r
_loss
dis 
hos.  
Based on the above statements, in this repeated game context, we could easily find the dominant strategy 
for two game players. From the perspective of mobile health marketers, we can see that  
M
r
 profitdi
s 
hos＞M
r
_profit
dis 
fri ＞0＞-M
r
_loss
pro 
hos . In this case, collecting users’ private health information in a 
hostile way will lead to loss rather than 0, when mobile health users’ strategy is to protect their private health 
information. In a long-term, therefore, collecting users’ private health information in a friendly way is 
continuously profitable for marketers. From the perspective of mobile health users, we can see that U
r
_profit
dis 
fri
＞Ur_profitpro hos＞- U
r
_loss
dis 
hos. Therefore, when marketers’ strategy is to collect users’ private health information in 
a friendly way, the best response strategy of users will be disclosing private health information. When 
marketers’ strategy is to collect users’ private health information in a hostile way, the best response strategy of 
users will be protecting their private health information. In this case, marketers will choose to collect users’ 
private health information in a friendly way for continued profit, and then users will disclose their private health 
information. Therefore, the best response set for marketers and users will be (U
r
_profit
dis 
fri , M
r
_profit
dis 
fri ). This 
strategy set will lead to mutual benefits for both players in the long run.  
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this study, we draw on the game theory to explain the personalization-privacy paradox in the context of 
mobile health services. Health services, different from other services, is closely related to peoples’ lives. 
Individuals may take cautious attitudes toward this emerging health services from a mobile platform. Users 
could enjoy personalized health services from mobile platforms, such as smartphones if they agree to upload and 
report their health record, medical history, and demographic characteristics. However, users are hesitant that 
mobile health marketers or servers may disclose or abuse their private information for illegal profit-making. 
With respect to mobile health marketers, in a one-shot game, the dominant strategy of marketers is to collect 
users’ private health information in a hostile way for maximum profit. However, in a repeated game, collecting 
users’ private health information in a friendly way is profitable for the marketer in a long term.  
This study contributes to the knowledge stock of mobile health marketers by presenting an insight of the 
personalization-privacy paradox from game-theoretical perspective. Marketers aim to build a long-term 
relationship with users in order to continuously collect users’ private health information to better understand 
users’ health needs and provide personalized health services to users for profit. To make their payoffs maximum, 
marketers should choose the strategy of collecting users’ private health information in a hostile way in a 
one-shot game. Instead, marketers choose to collect users’ private health information in a friendly way in the 
repeated game in a long term. In practice, compared to a hostile collection of users’ private health information, 
collecting private health information in a friendly way could not only reduce users’ health privacy concern and 
offer users personalized health services but also avoid network security inspection. For marketers, our 
recommendations are that they should incorporate privacy-safe features and user-friendly designs in the mobile 
heath application development.  
For mobile health users, they hope to gain benefits from personalized health services but are highly 
concerned about health privacy. In this game, users will choose the best way to respond the strategy of mobile 
health marketers in order to maximize their own payoff. If mobile health marketers’ strategy is to collect users’ 
private health information in a hostile way, users’ best response is to protect their private health information. If 
mobile health marketers’ strategy is to collect users’ private health information in a friendly way, users’ best 
response is to disclose their private health information. In practice, comparing to protecting private health 
information, disclosing private health information is beneficial to users who can gain personalized health 
services, and to marketers who can utilize private health information to generate individually tailored health 
services for maximum payoff. Our study recommends that users should alleviate their health privacy concerns, 
and feel more secure that their private health information never actually be abused in a long run. 
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